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ABSTRACT 
 
Katrina Elliott: On the Relationship between Macrostates and Microstates 
(Under the direction of Marc Lange) 
 
 There is a popular thesis regarding the relationship between macrostates and 
microstates called ‘supervenience’.  In roughly the first half of this paper, I argue that 
supervenience, despite its intuitive appeal, is false.  I claim that microstates do not, contra 
supervenience, determine macrostates, but rather, that macrostates are determined by 
probability distributions over microstates.  In the second half of this paper, I spend time 
exploring, clarifying, and defending this view.  I conclude that, while more work must be 
done than I can do here to adequately defend my favored replacement for the supervenience 
thesis, it is a prima facie plausible and promising view.      
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I. Introduction 
In his essay "Evoluntionary Theory and the Reality of Macro Probabilities", Elliott 
Sober writes, "Quantum mechanics has forced philosophers to take seriously the possibility 
that the diachronic thesis of determinism may be false.  Perhaps the synchronic determination 
thesis should be re-evaluated as well."1  Here Sober is referring to a particular thesis 
regarding the relationship between microstates and macrostates according to which the actual 
macrostate of a system at a time is determined (along with the physical laws) by the actual 
microstate of the system at that time.  Sober is right to suggest that this thesis, which I will 
call "supervenience", calls for re-evaluation.  In fact, it is, as I will argue, demonstrably false.  
In the first half of this essay, after first familiarizing the reader with microstates, macrostates, 
and supervenience, I will show that there are some microstates that could realize more than 
one macrostate, and thus that a system’s actual microstate does not determine which of these 
possible macrostates the system is in.  In the second half of this essay, I will provide and 
defend a positive account of the relationship between microstates and macrostates that can 
accommodate, and is motivated by, the counterexamples to supervenience.  It is a 
consequence of the view I develop that microstates never determine macrostates, though it 
may still be that in the usual case, a microstate is a possible realizer of only one macrostate.  
On the view I favor, a macrostate is determined not by any actual microstate, but by objective 
macrochances represented by a probability distribution over possible microstates.  Though in 
the end I will conclude that more work must be done to sufficiently defend the view I 
                                                            
1 Sober (pg. 12) 
propose, I will have hopefully provided the reader with prima facie evidence that the thesis 
that macrostates are determined by probability distributions over microstates is a promising 
replacement for the supervenience thesis. 
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II. Microstates and Macrostates 
 A survey of the sciences appears to reveal that putative scientific explanations of the 
same event come at various levels, that putative scientific laws govern the same phenomena 
at different levels, and that different sciences describe the same systems differently.  There is 
much philosophical debate about which putative explanations are genuine explanations, 
about which putative scientific laws are genuine laws instead of mere regularities, and about 
what descriptions of systems, if any, “carve nature at its joints”.  Furthermore, all of these 
issues are deeply interconnected, so that what one takes to be, say, the genuine laws informs 
what one takes to be the genuine explanations and natural-kind descriptions.  It is, then, very 
difficult to find a neutral avenue into the topic.  What does seem slightly less controversial is 
that there are some cases where two sciences, at least intuitively, appear to offer different 
explanations, laws, and descriptions of the same system at different levels.2
 Consider, for example, a container of gas. A thermodynamic description of this gas 
includes its pressure, temperature, and volume.  The laws of thermodynamics and their 
entailments explain, given some thermodynamically described initial conditions, the behavior 
of the pressure, temperature, and volume of a gas over time.  The same box of gas can also be 
described in terms of the positions, velocities, and intrinsic properties of its particles and the 
behavior of these particles may be explained by classical mechanics (or whatever theory, in 
                                                            
2 Because terms like ‘law’ and ‘explanation’ are very useful when describing such cases, I will use them on the 
understanding that, in so doing, I do not mean to settle whether what I call a ‘law’ or an ‘explanation’ is really, 
on careful philosophical inspection, a law or explanation.  Rather, I mean to be referring to the sorts of things 
that appear in various sciences and, thus, are putative laws and explanations.   
fact, describes the laws that govern the fundamental particles).3  So, two different sciences 
describe this gas in two different ways, and each science offers laws that govern and explain 
the behavior of the gas so described. 
 Or, consider the evolution of some biological population.  Darwinian evolutionary 
theory may describe the population by specifying what proportion of its members have what 
phenotype and the fitness of each phenotype, and then appeal to natural selection to predict 
and explain (as long as there are no further mutations, migrations, or other relevant 
disturbances) the proportion of each phenotype in the subsequent generations of that 
population.  Mendelian genetics, on the other hand, might describe the same population in 
terms of the genotypes of each of its individual members, along with whatever description is 
needed (which perhaps includes a description of additional biological features and the 
environment of each individual) to explain their reproductive futures, and predict and explain 
the genotypes of the individual members of subsequent generations of that population with 
an appeal to laws that govern the results of the breeding of individuals with various 
genotypes.  Again, then, we have a system (a biological population) that can be described in 
at least two different ways (in terms of the proportion of phenotypes found in a population or 
in terms of the genotypes of individual members of the population) and laws (natural 
selection or Mendel’s two laws and others) of two different sciences that govern and explain 
the behavior of the system in terms of their respective descriptions.   
 To introduce some terminology, when there are two sciences that describe a system at 
a particular time in different terms, let the broader, or upper level, description be called the 
                                                            
3 Throughout this essay, when describing examples I will assume, contrary to what is now thought, that our 
world is governed by fundamentally deterministic laws.  This assumption makes the cases much easier to 
describe, and the fact that it is false does not damage the philosophical point.  Later I will explain how my 
positive view accommodates the possibility that our world is fundamentally indeterministic.   
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‘macrostate’ of the system at that time, and let the more fine grained, or lower level, 
description, be called the ‘microstate’ of that system at that time.4  For our gas example, 
then, the system’s macrostate is its pressure, volume, and temperature, while its microstate is 
the velocities, positions, and additional intrinsic properties of its particles.  And, the 
macrostate of our biological population is the proportion of various phenotypes in that 
population and the fitness of each phenotype, while the microstate is the genotype of each of 
the individuals in the population and the biological and environmental features needed to 
explain each individual’s reproductive fate. 
 A description’s counting as a macrostate or a microstate is relative to the description 
it is being compared to.  For example, a psychological description of a system may be its 
microstate relative to a sociological description of the same system, but the same 
psychological description may be the system’s macrostate relative to a neuropsychological 
description of that system.  The examples I will work with always involve only two 
descriptions, so there will be no ambiguity about which description is the macrostate and 
which is the microstate. 
 It will also be useful to introduce the verb ‘realize’ and the noun ‘microrealizer’.  I 
will say that the microstate that a system is in when it is in some macrostate ‘realizes’ that 
macrostate, and I will refer to all of the microstates that can realize a given macrostate as that 
macrostate’s  ‘microrealizers’.  For example, given the macrostate of a gas at a time, one 
might wonder what microstate realizes that macrostate at that time, which is just to wonder 
what microstate the system in at the time.  
                                                            
4 Macrostates and microstates give complete descriptions of a system at a time.  For example, the macrostate of 
a gas is its pressure, temperature, and volume, not just its volume.  That said, sometimes my examples will be 
concerned with only one constituent of the macrostate of a system.     
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 Now, as we saw in both the thermodynamic and biological examples, the laws that 
govern the macrostate of some system are often different from the laws that govern the 
microstate of the system.  Furthermore, sometimes a macrolevel law will assign a non-
extremal probability to a system’s being in some macrostate at a time while a microlevel law 
assigns an extremal, or a different non-extremal, probability to the system’s being in some 
microstate at that time.  For example, on the statistical mechanical interpretation of 
thermodynamics, the probability that a hot gas will get hotter when put in thermal contact 
with a cool gas for an extended period (but otherwise isolated) is extremely low.  However, 
the Newtonian laws of motion, which we will assume deterministically govern the particles 
of gas, assign (given the initial microstate of the gas) only extremal probabilities to a system 
being in a particular microstate.  Here we have a case where the macrolevel laws assign non-
extremal probabilities to a system’s being in a particular macrostate at some time while the 
microlevel laws assign extremal probabilities to the same system being in a particular 
microstate at that time.   
 Cases like the above lead naturally to questions about the relations between 
macrolevel and microlevel laws, between the chances they ascribe, and between macrostates 
and microstates.  Each of these issues is controversial, but one place to start is with the 
relationship between macrostates and microstates.  As it happens, there is a widely accepted 
view on this topic according to which macrostates are determined by microstates, but 
microstates are not determined by macrostates.  That is, the macrostate of a system at a time 
is fixed by the physical laws and the microstate of a system at that time, but the microstate of 
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a system at a time is not fixed by the physical laws and the macrostate of that system.5  This 
thesis, I shall shortly argue, is false. 
                                                            
5 One may understand this thesis modally:  For two worlds with identical physical laws, if the same microstate 
obtains at a time in both worlds, the same macrostate obtains at that time in both worlds.  But, for two worlds 
with identical physical laws, if the same macrostate obtains at a time in both worlds, the microstate that obtains 
at that time need not be the same in both worlds. 
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III. Supervenience 
 It is a well known fact that the macrostate of a system does not always determine that 
system’s microstate6.  Fixing the physical laws of a world and fixing the macrostate of a 
particular system is insufficient to fix the microstate of that system. Consider, for example, a 
description of some individual in terms of her phenotypes.  To simplify, let us focus on eye 
color as the particular phenotype we are interested in, and let the macrostate of the individual 
consist solely in whether or not her eye color is brown.  Finally suppose that her eye color is 
brown, and so she is in the corresponding macrostate.    
 Consider also the microstate that this individual is in, and let this description be in 
terms of her genotype.  Now, the fact that she is in the brown-eyed macrostate does not 
determine what genotypic microstate she is in.  The gene for brown eye color is dominant, so 
someone with brown eyes has either a homozygous dominant genotype or a heterozygous 
genotype.  So, the fact that someone is in a particular macrostate does not determine what 
microstate one is in, for the physical laws and the fact that one has brown eyes are consistent 
with one having either of two different genotypes.  Fixing the macrostate of our individual is 
insufficient to fix the microstate she is in. 
 This point generalizes to many other cases.  For example, the fact that a gas has some 
particular pressure, temperature, and volume does not determine the position, velocity, and 
intrinsic properties of the particles that compose that gas.  Or, as philosophers of mind know 
                                                            
6 I am not willing to rule out the possibility that someone thinks that there is a case where the macrostate that a 
system is in does, in fact, determine that system’s microstate.  This is not, however, the usual case.   
well, the fact that a certain mental state obtains does not determine what physical state 
obtains.  There are many more examples in the sciences in which the macrostate of a system 
does not determine what particular microstate that system is in.  Plainly, then, macrostates do 
not always determine microstates.  Do microstates determine macrostates? 
 The intuitive answer seems to be yes.  Return to our example of the brown-eyed 
individual.  Suppose it turns out that her relevant genotype is heterozygous.  This fact does 
seem, along with the physical laws, to fix the fact that her eye color is brown.  After all, there 
is only one macrostate, namely the brown-eyed macrostate, an individual could be in if she 
was in the relevant heterozygous microstate, since the gene for brown eyes is dominant.  So, 
here it seems that the microstate does determine the macrostate.  Similarly, the fact that the 
particles of a gas have certain velocities seems to determine the temperature of the gas, or the 
fact that an individual is in a certain brain state seems to determine that she is in pain.  The 
examples are easy to multiply.  The thought is that, for a given macrostate, there are many 
possible microrealizers of that macrostate, but that each microstate can realize only one 
macrostate, and so microstates determine macrostates. 
 To borrow a philosopher’s term of art, let the thesis that microstates determine 
macrostates be described as the thesis that macrostates “supervene on” microstates, or 
“supervenience” for short.7  Despite its intuitive appeal, I will argue, with the help of two 
counterexamples, that supervenience is false. 
                                                            
7 “Supervenience” is used by different philosophers to mean different things.  I will only use it to refer to the 
thesis that microstates determine macrostates.     
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IV. Counterexamples to Supervenience  
Case 1: The Roulette Wheel 
 Imagine a roulette wheel and suppose that it is given a vigorous spin at some time, t1.  
Let the macrostate at t1, that of being a roulette wheel vigorously spinning, be called ‘V’.  
Now, roulette wheels are used for gambling because the fact that a wheel is vigorously 
spinning at some time does not determine what numbered, colored slot the ball will land in at 
some later time.  That is, the system’s macrostate being V at t1 is compatible with the system 
being, at some later time t2, in any one of the thirty-eight different macro-states that 
correspond to the thirty-eight slots on a roulette wheel.8  Let us suppose, for the example, 
that the macrostate our system actually is in at t2 is the state in which the wheel has stopped 
and the ball is in the red twenty-one slot.  Let this macrostate be called ‘R’, for ‘red twenty-
one’. 
 The microstate of the roulette wheel is given by whatever description (such as the 
position and velocity of the marble, the position and velocity of the wheel, coefficients of 
friction, etc.,) is necessary for roughly Newtonian laws to predict its evolution.  Now, there 
are many possible such microstates that could realize V.  If we assume that the world is 
fundamentally deterministic, and that our system is appropriately isolated, some of the 
microstates that could realize V would deterministically evolve into microstates that realize 
the macrostate black twenty-nine, some would evolve into microstates that realize the 
macrostate red twenty-seven, and so on.  According to our example, our system is in V at t1 
                                                            
8 We are supposing that it is an American roulette wheel, hence the thirty-eight slots. 
and R at t2, so the microstate that actually realizes V must be one that deterministically 
evolves into a microstate that actually realizes R.  Call the microstate that the system is 
actually in at t1 ‘a’, for ‘actual’.  If microstates determine macrostates, then the fact that the 
microstate is a at t1 determines that the macrostate is V at t1. 
 Now consider the same roulette wheel, but suppose that instead of being a vigorously 
spinning roulette wheel, it is a wheel spun by an extremely talented hustler.  This hustler is so 
good that when he spins the wheel, the wheel is in a state that is very likely to evolve into a 
state in which the ball is the red twenty-one slot.  Suppose that our hustler has just spun the 
wheel, and call the macrostate that the wheel is in ‘H’, for ‘hustling spin’.9  If the system’s 
macrostate is H at t1, then at some later time t2, the system will very likely be in macrostate 
R.  That is, if the wheel is in H it will very likely end up in the same macrostate that the 
wheel in V happened to end up in.  Finally suppose that the likely thing does happen, and that 
H evolves into R. 
 The microstates that could realize V are all of those microstates that would (given that 
the system is appropriately isolated) deterministically evolve into realizers of R, as well as all 
those microstates that would evolve into realizers of the thirty-seven other macrostates that 
the wheel could end up in.  Let us stipulate, to fill out the example, that the microstates that 
could realize H are, in contrast, those microstates that would evolve into realizers of R and a 
few that would not.  The microstate a, then, is a possible realizer of H, because a would 
deterministically evolve into a microstate that realizes R.10  Let us suppose that a is the actual 
                                                            
9 I do not mean to suggest that the state of the wheel, H, is a relational property between the wheel and some 
hustler.  The image of the hustler is intended only to fix one’s mind on a relevant fact about macrostate H, 
which is that it is very likely to evolve into R. 
 
10 The details here are not terribly important.  Any stipulation would do, so long as it preserves the fact that H is 
very likely to evolve into R, and that a is a possible realizer of H.   
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microstate that realizes H at t1.  If microstates determine macrostates, then the fact that the 
microstate is a at t1 determines that the macrostate is H at t1. 
 Now we have a problem for supervenience.  In the vigorously spun wheel example, a 
realizes V, but in the hustler example, a realizes H.  So, the fact that a system is in microstate 
a at t1 does not determine what macrostate the system is in at t1, since a could be the realizer 
of either macrostate V or H.  In this case, then, supervenience fails.  Microstates do not 
always determine macrostates.        
Case 2: Gas in a Box 
 Consider a five liter box of gas.  The macrostate of this gas at a given time, the 
behavior of which is governed by the laws of thermodynamics, is given by its pressure, 
volume, and temperature.  In particular, the volume of this gas is five liters.  Let the 
macrostate of this gas, then, be referred to as ‘F’ for ‘five’. 
 We will assume that the evolution of this gas's microstate is governed, assuming that 
the gas is appropriately isolated, by Newtonian mechanics, and is given by a specification of 
the locations and velocities and additional intrinsic properties of its particles.  At the 
microlevel, the gas is a swarm consisting of individual particles that are constantly moving at 
different velocities and occupying different positions.  One may wonder, then, what the 
relationship is between the volume of a gas at some time and the positions and velocities of 
its particles at that time.    
 A tempting thought is that the volume of the gas at a time can be read off in some 
way from facts about the particles of that gas at that time.  But, there are several reasons why 
that cannot be right.  Let us suppose that there is no issue of how to determine the volume of 
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a particle, and conceive of particles as spherical solids.11  One way we might try to determine 
the volume of a gas at a time from facts about the particles of that gas at that time is to say 
that the volume of the gas is equal to the sum of the volume of the gas particles.  So, we 
would determine the volume of each of the particles, add these volumes together, and get the 
volume of the gas.  This suggestion, however, is obviously hopeless.  The sum of the volume 
of the particles of a gas is much less than the volume of a gas.  A five liter gas at any time is 
constituted mostly by empty space, not by five liters of particle interiors. 
 Instead, we might try determining the volume of the gas by drawing the smallest 
single boundary possible around the particles of the gas at some time and finding the volume 
of that boundary.  This strategy too, however, will not work.  At any time, the positions of 
the particles of gas dispersed throughout the container will typically not be pressed against 
the sides of the gas’s container, and so the volume of a boundary drawn around these 
particles will be smaller than the volume of the box.  Rather than sitting at the edge of their 
container, the gas particles will be in various stages of moving toward or away from the sides 
of their container, moving closer or further away from it as time passes.  Consider a 
representation of this strategy: 
                                                            
11 The fact that particles are not spherical solids, and the fact that determining the volume of a particle is no 
uncontroversial matter, only enforces my claim that the volume of a gas at a time cannot be read off 
straightforwardly from facts about the volume of its particles at a time. 
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  In the above figure, the black dots represent particles.  According to the considered 
suggestion, one would find the volume of this gas by calculating the volume of the boundary 
represented by the curved black line.  Of course, the image is not to scale, I have exaggerated 
the particles’ distances from the sides of the box, and there are far too few particles drawn.  
Hopefully, despite these creative liberties, the problem is clear:  the volume of the boundary 
is less than the volume of the box.  Plainly, however, the fact that there are (many) times 
when the particles of a gas are not pressed against the sides of a five liter container does not 
lead us to doubt that the gas is, in fact, five liters.   
Figure 1 
 On reflection, we should not be surprised that there seems to be no good way to 
determine the volume of a gas from the positions and velocities of its particles at some time.  
After all, we think that the volume of a gas in a box stays constant as long as the system is 
undisturbed.  But we also think that the positions and velocities of its particles constantly 
fluctuate.  The particles at one moment will be in one configuration, at the next moment they 
will be in a different configuration.  At one moment some particles may be closer together 
than others, and at another moment those particles might be more widely spread, or the 
particles may be closer to the edge of the box at one time than they are at another.  These are 
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all variations that we expect the particles of a typical gas to undergo.  None of these 
variations, however, tempts us to conclude that the volume of a typical gas is 
correspondingly fluctuating over time.  To read the volume of a gas, which does not fluctuate 
over time, off of one particular configuration of its particles at a given time (which we expect 
will not be the same configuration at the next time) seems hopeless. 
 Return, then, to our five liter box of gas that is composed of swarming particles that 
are located in different parts of the box at different times.  Suppose that, for an instant, the 
particles of our gas find themselves bunched in a corner of the box.  Let us call the microstate 
of the gas at this instant ‘b’, for ‘bunched’.  Now, there is only a very small chance that 
particles of a five liter gas will be bunched together for an instant.  It is much more likely, 
according to the statistical mechanical interpretation of thermodynamics, that the particles, at 
each instant, are dispersed throughout the box.  Nevertheless it is possible for b to realize F.  
If microstates determine macrostates, then the fact that the system is in b determines that it is 
in F.   
 Next consider a smaller box of gas.  Suppose that the volume of this box is just large 
enough to contain particles arranged into microstate b.  The gas is this box is also 
overwhelmingly likely to be evenly dispersed throughout its container.  Imagine this smaller 
box is one liter and thus that the volume of the gas in the box is also one liter.  Call this 
macrostate ‘O’, for ‘one’.  Suppose that the particles of the gas in macrostate O find 
themselves, for an instant, arranged into microstate b.  Statistical mechanics tells us that it is 
very likely that the particles of a one liter gas will be dispersed in some way throughout that 
one liter, and so b is obviously a possible realizer of O.  If microstates determine macrostates, 
then the fact that the system is in b determines that it is in O.   
15 
 
 Again we have a problem for supervenience.  In the five liter gas example, b realizes 
F, but in the one liter gas example, b realizes O.  So, the fact that a system is in microstate b 
at some time does not determine what macrostate the system is in at that time since b could 
be the realizer of either macrostate F or O.  Here, too, supervenience fails. 
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V. Objections to the Counterexamples 
 But why, asks the proponent of supervenience, should we agree that, in the above two 
cases, the same microstate is a possible realizer of two different macrostates?  Take, for 
example, the roulette wheel counterexample.  According to the counterexample, there are 
two distinct macrostates, V and H, and a can realize either of them.  But, from the 
macrolevel, the instantiation of V and a at t1 is indistinguishable from the instantiation of H 
and a at t1.  Why suppose, then, that V and H are genuinely different macrostates?  Similarly, 
for the gas example, the instantiation of O and b at t1 is indistinguishable at the macrolevel 
from the instantiation of F and b.  Again, why then should we suppose that this is a case 
where a microstate can realize two different macrostates? 
 The objector is absolutely right when she points out that, in the cases where I have 
claimed that there are two different macrostates, the two different macrostates look the same 
at the moment that the different macrostates are realized by the same microstate.  After all, 
the macrostates are realized by the same microstate, and so a picture snapped at that moment 
looks the same regardless of which macrostate was instantiated at that moment.  However, I 
argue that this is not the right way to think of the individuation of macrostates.   
 Recall, for a moment, how we began worrying about macrostates and microstates to 
begin with.  The macrostate of a system is not any arbitrary description of that system.  
Rather, it is a description of that system that figures in the laws that govern that system.  The 
macrostate of a gas, for example, is not given by its pressure, temperature, and odor because 
there are no laws that govern the behavior of gasses in terms of their pressure, temperature, 
and odor.  The macrostate of a gas is its pressure, temperature, and volume because, as it 
turns out, there are thermodynamic laws that govern the behavior of gasses according to that 
description.  So, to determine what macrostate a system is in, we must be sensitive to the 
laws that govern that system. 
 Return, then, to the roulette wheel.  There are laws, which I will term ‘laws of 
gambling’, for lack of a better phrase, that govern the behavior of roulette wheels in terms of 
the sort of spin the wheel undergoes.  One such law is that the probability that a roulette 
wheel that is vigorously spinning will evolve into a wheel with the ball in the red twenty-one 
slot is 1/38.  Another law is that the probability that a roulette wheel that undergoes a 
hustling spin will evolve into a wheel with the ball in red twenty-one is very high.  The 
gambling laws, then, distinguish between the macrostates V and H by assigning different 
probabilities to the sorts of evolutions these systems can undergo.  The laws are not 
concerned with how these two macrostates look, nor are they concerned with what microstate 
happens to realize these two macrostates.  That these two macrostates are different is 
established by the different probabilities the laws of gambling assign to their possible 
evolutions.  Once we agree that V and H are different macrostates, it is obvious that a could 
realize either, since both are macrostates that could, but with a different probability, evolve 
into macrostates realized by the microstate that a deterministically evolves into.   
 The objector may still not be satisfied.  Perhaps she will respond now by rejecting my 
claim that there are laws of gambling that govern the evolution of roulette wheels in terms of 
the sort of spin they undergo. 12  I am not swayed by this response.  There certainly seem to 
be laws of gambling.  After all, it seems true that vigorously spun roulette wheel have a 1/38 
                                                            
12  Anyone skeptical of the existence of laws of gambling has an invitation to come over to my house any time.  
Be sure to bring money. 
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chance of landing in red twenty-one.  Furthermore, it seems that this fact explains why it is 
that, approximately 1/38 of the time, vigorously spun roulette wheel land in red twenty-one.  
Similarly, it seems true that a roulette wheel undergoing hustling spin has a very high 
probability of landing in red twenty-one, and this fact seems to explain why it is that roulette 
wheels undergoing this sort of spin very often land in red twenty-one.  These putative laws 
look just as good, at least in terms of truth and explanatory power, as other macrolevel laws. 
 That said, perhaps the roulette wheel case still worries the reader.  Turn, then, to the 
gas in a box example.  In this example, I claim that the macrostates O and F are different 
macrostates.  Surely no one will argue that there is no difference between a gas being one 
liters and a gas being five liters.  Instead, the objection is likely to be that the gas in a five 
liter box, when it is momentarily in microstate b, is momentarily a one liter gas.  That is, one 
might object that b can only realize O, and so b is not, contrary to my counterexample, a 
possible realizer of F.  After all, argues our imagined objector, O when realized by b looks 
exactly like a putative realization of F by b, and this is so because b does not actually realize 
F at all. 
 I have already argued that it is hopeless to read off the volume of a gas at a moment 
from the positions and volume of its particles at that moment.  So, it will not do to argue that 
the volume of the gas in the five liter box changes to one liter for a moment on the grounds 
that its particles are in a particular position for that moment.   
 But, the objector might press, the microstate of the gas is not given by merely a 
description of the position, velocity, etc., of its particles, but also by facts about the container 
in which these particles are located.  After all, these latter facts are required if Newtonian 
mechanics is to explain and predict the evolution of the system, and so these latter facts 
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should be included in the system's microstate.  If the microstate of a gas includes facts about 
the gas's container, then we do not have the same microstate that can realize two different 
macrostates, since we do not have the same microstate. 
 It is true that the particles of the gas causally interact with their container.  One 
cannot, then, from a specification of the velocities, positions, etc., of the particles of the gas 
and the physical laws, explain and predict the future velocities, particles, etc., of the gas.  
Further facts, including facts about the box, are required for such explanation and prediction. 
 Nevertheless, the microstate of a gas is a specification of just facts about the particles 
of that gas and does not include facts about its container.  The microstate (or macrostate) of a 
system is a description of the intrinsic properties of that system.13  If we consider the system 
that is the gas, not the gas and its container, the microstate of that system does not include 
facts about its container.  Facts about the container may well be relevant to an explanation of 
why the microstate of a gas at a time is what it is, but this does not show that these facts 
partially constitute the microstate of the system. 
 And the same thing is true on the macrolevel.  The volume of a gas at a particular 
time is not a relational property between the gas and its container, though the causal 
explanation for why the volume is what it is may very well include facts about its container.  
The fact that a gas's container changed sizes, for example, may well be relevant to an 
explanation of why the gas's volume changed from five liters to ten.  Nevertheless, volume is 
a property of a gas simpliciter, not a gas and its container.   
So, though facts about a gas’s container may be relevant to explaining and predicting 
the evolution of either the microstate or macrostate of a system, these facts are included in 
                                                            
13 The matter of whether or not spatiotemporal properties count as intrinsic properties is controversial, and I 
wish to remain neutral on it.  If spatiotemporal properties are not intrinsic properties, then a system’s microstate 
is a description of that system’s intrinsic properties and spatiotemporal properties.   
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neither the microstate nor macrostate of that system, and the counterexample to 
supervenience is preserved.   
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VI. A Replacement for the Supervenience Thesis 
 If microstates do not determine macrostates, what, then, is the relationship between 
macrostates and microstates?  Perhaps we can find an answer to this question by returning to 
the counterexamples to supervenience and discovering what, in those cases, does seem to 
determine the macrostates of the systems in question. 
 In the case of the roulette wheel, I have argued that the fact that the system is in 
microstate a does not determine what macrostate, V or H, the system is in.  In other words, 
what microstate the system is in at a particular moment does not account for the macrolevel 
difference between a system in V and a system in H.  What, then, does account for the 
difference?  One natural thought is that, though a can be a realizer of either V or H, the 
microstate a is more likely when H obtains than it is when V obtains.  That is, it seems more 
likely for H (which will likely land on red twenty-one) than for V (which has no greater 
chance of landing on red twenty-one than any other slot) to be realized by a microstate that 
deterministically evolves into a microstate that realizes red twenty-one.  And this natural 
thought leads to the supposition that the macrostate V and macrostate H are determined not 
by a particular microstate, but by a probability distribution over microstates.   
 To fix the intuitive idea behind the thesis, let us, for a moment, play fast and loose.  
Let us suppose that, given that a system is in macrostate V, there is an objective, non-
maximal chance that a obtains, as well as an objective, non-maximal chance that many other 
microstates obtain.  That there are such chances is, I think, is suggested by the intuition 
mentioned above: that the probability of b is non-maximal, and that its value depends on the 
macrostate of the system.  But for the time being, let us assume that there are such 
probabilities and see what good they do us.   
 When the system is in macrostate V , let me stipulate that the value of the non-
extremal probability that any particular possible realizer of V obtains is equal to the value of 
the probability that any other particular possible realizer of V obtains14.  After all, V is a fair 
spin, so it seems that no microstate that could realize V has any greater chance of obtaining 
than any other microstate that could realize V. The value of these non-maximal probabilities 
is given by a probability distribution, which looks as follows:  
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Possible Microrealizers of V
Figure 2  
Our favorite microstate a is assigned, like all other possible realizers of V, a positive non-
maximal probability by this probability distribution.  According to the thesis that macrostates 
are determined by probability distributions over microstates, it is in virtue of the fact that the 
                                                            
14 The above graph may be thought of as either a probability distribution or a probability density distribution, 
depending on one's view on how many microstates there are in question.  In what follows I will ignore this 
complication and treat the graphs as descriptions of probability distributions.  Also, microstates that receive 
probability zero on the distribution (those that are not possible microrealizers of the relevant macrostate) are not 
represented. 
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above probability distribution obtains over microstates at a given moment that that system is 
in macrostate V at that moment. 
 If probability distributions determine macrostates, we should expect that the 
probability distribution associated with macrostate H is different from the probability 
distribution associated with macrostate V.  Intuitively, this is, in fact, the case.  The 
probability of various microstates obtaining if H obtains is different from the probability of 
various microstate obtaining if V obtains.  For example, since it is very likely that H will 
evolve into R, it seems that microstates that deterministically evolve into realizers of 
macrostates other than R are very improbable given H.  Or, suppose that H has no chance of 
evolving into a system where the ball lands in a black slot.  Then, the probability that a 
microstate that deterministically evolves into a realizer of a macrostate where the ball lands 
in a black slot is not a possible realizer of H.  But, such a state is a possible realizer of V, and 
so receives a probability greater than zero on V’s probability distribution.  So, intuitively the 
probability distribution associated with H is different than the probability distribution 
associated with V.  Let me then stipulate that the probability distribution associated with H 
looks as follows: 
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Possible Microrealizers of H 
Figure 3  
Again, our favorite microstate a is assigned a positive non-maximal probability.  And, again, 
according to the thesis that macrostates are determined by probability distributions over 
microstates, it is in virtue of the fact that the above probability distribution obtains over 
microstates like a that the system is in macrostate H.   
 The supposition that macrostates are determined by a probability distribution over 
possible microstates explains how it can be that V and H are different macrostates realized by 
the same microstate.  Consider the two distributions together: 
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Figure 4 
The fact that a can realize either V or H is explained by the fact that a is assigned a 
probability greater than zero by both distributions, and so a is a possible realizer of both 
distributions.  The fact that V and H are nevertheless different macrostates is explained by the 
fact that the probability distribution that determines V is very different from the probability 
distribution that determines H.  So, on the view that macrostates are determined by 
microstates, we have a nice way of accommodating cases like that of the roulette wheel 
which caused trouble for the rival thesis supervenience.   
 The thesis that macrostates are determined by probability distributions over 
microstates is similarly suggested by, and accommodates, the case of the gas in a box.  Recall 
that I argued that both the macrostate O and the macrostate F could be realized by the same 
microstate, namely b.  What, then, accounts for the difference between a system that is in b 
and O, and a system that is in b and F?  The answer seems to be that in the former, the 
chance that b obtained was more likely than it was in the latter.  Again, this intuitive thought 
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that the chance of b is different in the two cases leads to the thought that macrostates are not 
determined by microstates, but by probability distributions over microstates. 
 Still playing fast and loose, let us again suppose that there is an objective, non-
maximal chance that b obtains given that the system is in macrostate F, and that there is an 
objective non-maximal chance that many other microstates obtain.  The value of the chance 
of b given F is equal to the value of any other microrealizer of F given F.  But, since 
(roughly) many more of the possible microrealizers of F involve the particles being dispersed 
throughout the gas than involve the particles being bunched, the probability that the particles 
of a five liter gas will be dispersed throughout the box is much greater than the probability 
that the particles will be bunched.  With this in mind, then, let me stipulate that the 
probability distribution associated with F, which assigns probabilities to microstates like b, 
looks as follows15: 
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Possible Microrealizers of  F 
Figure 5  
                                                            
15 I do not mean to suggest that, as a matter of empirical fact, this is what the probability distribution actually 
looks like.  Presumably statistical mechanics discovers what the probability distribution over microstates, or 
over regions of phase space, actually looks like.  But, this toy probability distribution is enough to make the 
philosophical point as are the other toy probability distributions that I will stipulate.   
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 The above probability distribution assigns b a non-maximal probability equal to the 
value it assigns all other possible microrealizers of F.  It is in virtue of this fact and other 
facts about the value of the probabilities that the above distribution assigns to various 
microstates that the system’s macrostate is F.  That is, because the above probability 
distribution obtains over microstates at a moment, that system is in F at that moment.   
 Again, if macrostates are determined by probability distributions over microstates, 
then we should expect that the probability distribution associated with O is different than the 
above probability distribution that was associated with F.  Intuitively, this is in fact the case.  
To see this, we need only consider the fact that there are microstates that the probability 
distribution associated with F assigns a probability greater than zero to which the distribution 
associated with O assigns zero to.  In other words, there are some microstates that could 
realize F that could not realize O, namely those microstates where the particles are dispersed 
throughout an area greater than one liter.  Furthermore, since we began with the intuition that 
the probability of b is different if the system is in F than it is if the system is in O, we again 
can see that the probability distribution associated with O is different than the probability 
distribution associated with F.  Let me, in accord with these intuitions, stipulate that the 
probability distribution associated with O looks as follows: 
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Figure 6  
  The above distribution assigns b a positive, non-maximal probability, and the value of 
this probability is greater than the probability that the distribution associated with F assigned 
to b.  On the view we have been considering, the fact that the above distribution obtains over 
microstates at a moment determines that the macrostate of the system at the moment is O. 
 Now we can see that, in this case too, the fact that b is a possible realizer of both O 
and F, though O and F are different macrostates, can be explained by the view that 
macrostates are determined by probability distributions.  As we have seen, both distributions 
assign b a non-maximal probability which accounts for the fact that b is a possible realizer of 
both macrostates.  As we have also seen, the two distributions are different, assigning 
different values to many of the same macrostates, and this fact accounts for the fact that O 
and F are different macrostates.  So, again, the view that macrostates are determined by 
probability distributions over microstates deals very nicely with the cases that supervenience 
failed on.   
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VII. Two Kinds of Objective Probability 
 In the above section, I argued that if macrostates are determined by probability 
distributions over microstates, the counterexamples to supervenience can be explained.  In so 
doing, I asked the reader to suppose that there were objective non-maximal probabilities that 
a certain microstate obtains at a time given that a certain macrostate obtains at that time.  
That there are such probabilities, I argued, is suggested by our intuitions about the cases I 
described.  There is an intuition, for example, that when a box of gas is five liters, it is less 
likely that its microrealizer is b than it is when a box of gas is one liter.  This intuition seems 
to suggest that there is a certain non-maximal probability of b, given that the system is a five 
liter box of gas, that is different from the non-maximal probability of b, given that the system 
is a one liter box of gas.  And, that all suggests that there are non-maximal probabilities of a 
particular microstate at a time given a particular macrostate at that time. 
 However, one might object that, whatever our intuitions are in certain cases, one thing 
is clear:  in a world that is fundamentally deterministic, the probability of a microstate 
obtaining at a time, given the microlevel laws and the microstate of the system at some 
previous time, is either zero or one.  Further, the objector will surely point out, 
conditionalizing on additional facts, like the macrostate of the system at any time at all, does 
not change the probability of that microstate obtaining.  So, if the world is fundamentally 
deterministic, the chance of any microstate obtaining is zero or one, regardless of what 
macrostate obtains.  If the view that macrostates are determined by probability distributions 
over microstates requires that there are non-maximal probabilities of microstates in a world 
that is fundamentally deterministic, so much the worse for the view. 
 My response to this objection requires a clearer conception of the sorts of chances I 
have in mind when I claim that there are non-maximal probabilities of various microstates 
obtaining.  To begin, let me offer a rather metaphorical description of the way these chances 
work in the world.  Imagine if one could reach out into a world and grab a hold of some 
macrostate at some time.  It is important that what one grabs onto is only a macrostate, not a 
macrostate and a microstate16.  Having only grabbed at the macrolevel, one has not yet held 
fixed the microlevel.  But, the microlevel is not wholly free either, for having grabbed hold 
of a macrostate one has probabilistically constrained the microlevel facts.  For example, 
having grabbed hold merely of a gas being five liters in volume, one has not yet fixed the 
microstate of that gas.  To fix the microstate of the gas, one would need to additionally, 
perhaps with metaphysical tweezers, grab hold of a particular microstate.  With just the 
macrostate in hand, the microstate of the gas is free to be any number of possible microstates, 
and one has not yet held down, by merely fixing that the gas is five liters, any of these 
possibilities as the actual microstate.  However, one has put certain constraints on the 
possible microstates of the gas, and these constraints are the probabilities of the various 
microstates obtaining.  Having fixed that the gas is five liters, one has also held fixed, for 
example, that the probability that the particles of the gas are bunched together is very small.  
These probabilistic constraints that are placed on microstates by fixing macrostates are the 
non-maximal chances that I have in mind. 
                                                            
16Normally when one actually grabs a hold of a macrostate, in so doing she also grabs hold of a microstate.  If I 
grab five liters of gas for a moment, say by trapping it in a box, I will also have grabbed hold of some 
microstate: whatever microstate realizes the gas at that moment.  But, I want to imagine grabbing hold of just 
the microstate. 
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 Notice that none of the above is epistemic.  It is not simply that we know the 
macrostate of a system, but do not know the microstate, and so, out of ignorance, assign 
various credences to different microstates obtaining.  Rather, the point is metaphysical.  
Having fixed a particular fact about the world, the macrostate, we have not also fixed another 
fact about the world, the microstate.  When just the macrostate at a time has been fixed, the 
microstate at that time is not yet determined.  But, fixing the macrostate at a time does fix 
some constraint on what possible microstate obtains, in the form of a type of chance 
represented by a probability distribution over possible microstates. 
 However, as alluded to with my reference to metaphysical tweezers, grabbing hold of 
a macrostate is not the only way in which one can grab.  If, instead, one were to grab at the 
microlevel as it were, one would hold fixed different facts than if she were to grab at the 
macrolevel.  Just as grabbing a macrostate at a time puts certain constraints, in the form of a 
probability distribution, on what possible microstate is actualized, so too does grabbing a 
microstate at a time put constraints on what possible microstate is actualized at a later time.   
 If the laws are deterministic at the microlevel, then grabbing a microstate at a time 
puts very strict constraints on future possible microstates; the probability of some future 
microstate obtaining will be one or zero.  And these constraints hold at the microlevel 
regardless of what other features, say macrostates, one then fixes.  If we grab a hold at the 
microlevel and also at the macrolevel, we will not have placed any constraints on the 
microlevel that we would not have placed by grabbing only at the microlevel.  This is 
because the constraints one places on the world by fixing microlevel facts are, on the 
assumption that the world is fundamentally deterministic, stricter than the constraints one 
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places by fixing macrolevel facts.  It is no surprise, then, that fixing the microlevel and the 
macrolevel does not constrain the world any greater than does fixing just the microlevel. 
 What was the point of this rather prolonged “grabbing hold of” metaphor?  I want to 
argue that there are two distinct types of objective chance in the world, each represented by 
its own probability function.  One type of chance is represented by the probability function 
that corresponds to the metaphor of grabbing a hold of the world at the macrolevel: it 
describes the probability of a particular microstate at some time given that a particular 
macrostate holds at that time.  Intuitively, to fix a macrolevel fact about the world places 
constraints on possible microlevel facts about the world, and these intuitive constraints take 
the form of a type of chance described by a probability distribution over microstates. 
 But this sort of chance is not the only sort of chance, just as grabbing hold of a world 
at a macrolevel is not the only way in which one could grab.  There is another distinct type of 
chance represented by the probability function that corresponds to the metaphor of grabbing 
a hold of the world at the microlevel; it describes the probability of a particular microstate 
obtaining at some time given that other microstates obtain at previous times.  Intuitively, to 
fix a microlevel fact about the world places constraints on other possible microlevel facts 
about that world, and these constraints also take the form of a type of chance, but the 
probability function that represents this chance is distinct from the probability function that 
describes the probability of a microstate given only macrolevel features.   
 So the objector was right to point out that there is a probability function such that the 
probability of a microstate obtaining at a time, given deterministic microlaws and a 
microstate at a pervious time, is either one or zero.  The objector was further right to point 
out that conditionalizing on additional facts, like what macrostates obtain, does not change 
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the value of that probability.  However, all of this is perfectly consistent with my claim that 
there are different chances, namely those of a microstate obtaining at a time given merely the 
macrostate at that time.  These different probabilities correspond to the intuitively different 
ways that one might constrain the world by fixing particular facts about it.     
 But, my objector may still not be satisfied.  The natural concern now is that positing 
these extra probabilities is ontologically profligate.  We already have in our ontology the 
probabilities of microstates obtaining.  Why posit more? 
 My first answer is that my interlocutor’s ontology already includes the probabilities I 
posit, but by a different name.  This is because I suspect that macrostates are not merely 
determined by probability distributions over microstates, but rather, actually are probability 
distributions over microstates.  If this is right, then someone who already admits macrostates 
into his ontology, which is the sort of interlocutor I have assumed for this essay, already 
admits the sort of objective chances that I have posited.  
 Unfortunately, I have not here presented any argument for thinking that macrostates 
really are probability distributions, and someone who denied this claim could nevertheless 
agree with the weaker claim that I have argued for so far: that macrostates are determined by 
probability distributions over microstates.  So, my second, and less ambitious, response to the 
accusation that my ontology is bloated is that the probability distributions I posit are required 
to accommodate our intuitions in the counterexamples to supervenience.  That is, I have 
argued that, in the cases I present, there is an intuition that certain microstates are more or 
less likely, depending on what macrostate is instantiated.  Furthermore, the intuitive 
difference between a system being in one macrostate rather than another in these cases is that 
the probability that a certain microstate obtains changes depending on the macrostate of the 
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system.  These intuitions, it seems to me, demand the positing of new kind of probability 
distribution: one that describes the probability of microstates given a certain macrostate. 
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VIII. Microchance and Macrochance 
 To firmly fix how the probabilities that I posit operate and how they relate to more 
familiar probabilities, let us look at a particular example.  First, some terminology must be 
introduced.  I will refer to two different sorts of chance argued for above as “macrochance” 
and “microchance”.  The macrochance at a time of the macrostate that actually obtains at that 
time is 1, and so the macrochance at a time of some other macrostate (or microstate) 
obtaining (at any time) is implicitly conditional on the actual macrostate that obtains at that 
time.  Similarly for microchance, the microchance at a time of the microstate that obtains at 
that time is 1, and so the microchance at a time of some other microstate (or macrostate) 
obtaining is implicitly conditional on the actual microstate that obtains at that time. For 
shorthand, I will refer to the macrochance of an event as ‘CH’ and the microchance of an 
event as ‘ch’.   
 Now, for the example that follows, let ‘S’ stand for some macrostate instantiated at t1 
and let ‘s’ stand for some microstate instantiated at t1.  Let ‘R’ stand for some macrostate 
instantiated at t2 and let ‘r’ stand for some microstate instantiated at t2.  The following 
diagram describes this situation, along with a specification of the various chances of each 
state: 
  
                       CHt1(St1)                                                                 cht2(Rt2) 
                         S                          CHt1(Rt2|St1)                              R 
t1 t2 
 
     CH(st1|St1) 
 
   ch(Rt2|rt2) 
                s                          cht1(rt2|st1)                                    r 
           cht1(st1) 
          CHt1(st1) 
 Figure 7 
 Let us consider first cht1(st1), which is of the general form cht(st`).  This is the 
microchance of s.  As already mentioned, cht1(st1)=1, since the microchance at a time of the 
conditional on the microstate at that time, the value of this chance varies over time.  For 
example, in the example depicted above, the microchance of r at t2 may be different at t1 than 
it is at t2.  Microchances need not always be extremal, and will not be in a fundamentally 
indeterministic world.  In the example above, for instance, cht1(rt2)=cht1(rt2|st1), which may 
well be non-maximal. 
 Now, consider next CHt1(St1) and its general form CHt(St’).  This is the macrochance 
of S, and it behaves much like the microchance of s worked above.  Again, CHt1(St1)=1 since 
the macrochance at a time of the macrostate that obtains at that time is one.  Since 
macrochances at a time are implicitly conditional on the macrostate at that time, the value of 
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this chance varies over time.  For example, in the example above, CHt1(Rt2) might not equal 
CHt2(Rt2).  These chances, like their micro-counterparts above, need not be maximal, and will 
not be in a macro-indeterministic world.  In the above diagram, for instance, 
CHt1(Rt2)=CHt1(Rt2|St1), which may well be non-maximal. 
 Next consider cht1(rt2|st1), which is of the general form cht(rt`|st``).  This is the 
microchance of s given r, and is perhaps the most familiar sort of chance.  For example, 
David Lewis’ history-to-chance conditionals express this sort of microchance17.  The value 
of this chance, like the chances above, varies over time, and these values may be non-
extremal, depending on whether or not the world is fundamentally deterministic.  For 
example, in the above diagram, cht1(rt2|st1) may well be non-maximal, but, if the chance is 
indexed to t2 instead, its value is maximal.  That is, cht2(rt2|st1)=1. 
 The macro-counterpart to cht1(rt2|st1) is CHt1(Rt2|St1), and its general form is 
CHt(Rt’|St``).  This is the macrochance of R given S, and is the sort of chance we typically 
think of when we think of macrochances.  For example, the chance that a coin will land 
heads given that it is flipped is this sort of conditional chance.  It operates analogously to the 
above conditional microchances.  For example, as the indexing to the t indicates, its value 
changes over time, and if the world is macro-indeterministic, its value can be non-extremal.  
In the example above, for instance, CHt1(Rt2|St1) might be non-maximal, but CHt2(Rt2|St1)=1. 
 So much for the relatively uncontroversial chances, and on now to the particular sorts 
of chances I posit to handle the counterexamples to supervenience.  CH(st1|St1) is the 
macrochance of a microstate at a time given a macrostate at that time.  Its general form is 
CH(st|St).  The first thing to notice about this macrochance is that it is not time indexed, 
because its value does not change over time.  The chance, for instance, that in the far away 
                                                            
17 Lewis (1980) 
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future some particular microstate will obtain given that some particular macrostate obtains, is 
the same right now as it will be in that distant future.  The second interesting feature of this 
chance is that the macrostate and the microstate are indexed to the same time.  This is 
reflected in the intuition that, for example, that there is some chance that microstate a obtains 
at a time, given that the roulette wheel is vigorously spinning at that time.   
 Finally, the value of these chances is typically non-maximal, even though the world 
may be fundamentally deterministic, or macro-deterministic, or both.  Again, this is reflected 
in the intuition that the chance of, say, microstate a given that the macrostate is a vigorously 
spun roulette wheel, is lower, but greater than zero, than the chance of microstate a given that 
wheel’s spin is biased, which is higher, but less than, one.  And, all of this is so regardless of 
whether, say, the world is fundamentally deterministic. 
 Next up is CHt1(st1), which has the general form CHt(st’).  This is the macrochance 
that a particular microstate obtains.  This chance is, like other macrochances, is implicitly 
conditional on the macrostate that obtains at the time the chance is indexed to, so its value 
changes over time.  This implicit conditionalization, however, causes controversy for this 
chance form.  Consider a case where t and t’ have the same value, as in the example above.  
Then, the value of CHt1(st1)=CH(st1|St1) if S obtains at t1.  If s could realize some other 
macrostate, say, T, then CHt1(st1)=CH(st1|Tt1) if T obtains.  If no macrostate that s could 
realize obtains at the time in question, CHt1(st1)=0.  As a result of these equalities, CHt(st) is 
typically non-maximal, even when s obtains. 
 Initially, this seems counter-intuitive.  If s obtains, the chance of s seems like it 
should be one.  To sooth this intuition, it is important to keep in mind that, when s obtains, 
there is a chance of s that equals one: cht(st).  That said, there is, I claim, a different chance at 
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work as well, and that is CHt(St).  Further, if we are careful, perhaps this result is not really 
all that counter-intuitive.  Suppose I walk up to a casino dealer who holds in her hand a deck 
of cards and I ask her to fan out the cards on the table to reveal their arrangement.  I point to 
that arrangement and I say “What is the chance of that arrangement?”  My question is, I 
submit, ambiguous.  On one reading of my question, the appropriate answer is “One.  After 
all, it is the way that the cards are arranged.”  This answer gives the microchance of the 
arrangement at the time my question is asked, which is, I admit, one.  On another, and 
intuitively more helpful, reading of my question, the right answer is, “The chance is small, 
and equal to the chance of any other arrangement.  After all, it is a fair deck.”  This answer 
gives the macrochance of the arrangement, which, since it is a fair deck, is non-maximal.  It 
seems, then, that as long as we are careful to keep track of which probability we are 
interested in, it is not that strange that the there are chances of certain microstates obtaining 
that are non-maximal, even at the time that they obtain.   
 We end on a hopefully less controversial note with ch(Rt2|rt2), which is of the general 
form ch(Rt|rt), and cht2(Rt2), which is of the general form cht(Rt`).  The value of ch(Rt|rt) is 
extremal, regardless of whether or not the world is deterministic, and is 1 if R obtains at 0 
otherwise.  The idea here is that the probability that a microstate realizes the macrostate that 
it, in fact, does, is (as one would expect) one.  So, in the above example, ch(Rt1|rt1) is one.   
 The value of cht(Rt`) changes over time, and need not be extremal.  For example, the 
value of cht1(Rt2) may be non-maximal if the world is fundamentally deterministic, but 
cht2(Rt2) is extremal (and equal to ch(Rt2|rt2)), regardless of whether or not the world is 
deterministic.    
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IX. Objections from the Principal Principle 
 Now that we have an idea of how the chances I posit work and relate to more familiar 
chances, we have the tools to consider one final motivation for the rejection of my claim that 
there exist objective macrochances of the sort I describe.  David Lewis has argued famously 
that objective chances and credences stand in a certain relation, given by the Principal 
Principle, and so one test for whether or not a chance is objective is that it bears this relation 
to credence.18  If macrochances in general, and in particular the sort I posit, are objective 
chances, then they too must stand in this relation to rational credences. 
 The objection, predictably, is that they do not.  Above, I argued that there are two 
distinct species, one micro and one macro, of objective chance in the world.  Consider, again, 
the above diagram.  There is both, I maintain, CHt1(Rt2) and cht1(Rt2).  If the world is 
fundamentally deterministic, and if R obtains at t2, then the value of the latter chance is 1.  
Suppose that, as I maintain is possible, the world is indeterministic at the macrolevel, and 
that the value of the former chance is .5.   
 Consider also the particular macrochances required by the view that macrostates are 
determined by probability distributions over microstates.  In the above diagram s obtains at 
t1, and so the value of cht1(st1)=1.  I posit, however, an additional objective chance, CHt1(st1) 
that has a typically small value, which we will arbitrarily assume is .1.   
 At t1, what is the chance of R at t2?  Is it 1 or .5?  At t2, what is the chance of s at t2?  
Is it 1 or .1?  Of course, I claim that these questions are ambiguous.  There are two distinct, 
                                                            
18 Lewis (1980)  
compatible, and non-competing answers for each question which report the value of two 
distinct objective chances.  My opponent, however, disagrees, and claims that the Principal 
Principle is on his side.   
 According to the Principal Principle, if a rational agent knows the objective chance of 
some proposition P, then he will set his credence in P to the value of the objective chance of 
P, so long as he has no information from the future (what Lewis calls ‘inadmissible’ 
information) about whether or not P.19  Objective chances, then, are such that they rationally 
constrain credences.  But, argues my opponent, macrochances are not such that they 
rationally constrain credences, and thus are not objective.  After all, consider a rational agent 
who has no information about the future, but whatever information about the present and the 
past one likes, and suppose that at t1 he entertains the proposition that R obtains at t2.  What 
credence will the rational agent assign to the proposition that R obtains at t2?  We have the 
values of two putative objective chances for him to choose between, the macrochance value 
of .5 and the microchance value of 1.  Plainly, he will set his credence to the value of the 
latter.  If he knows that the microchance at t1 of R at t2 is 1, he will set his credence 
accordingly, regardless of whatever other (admissible) information, including the value of the 
supposedly objective macrochance, he has.  Thus, the macrochance at t1 of R at t2 is not 
really an objective chance, since it fails to rationally constrain credences.   
 A similar, and even more obviously damning, story can be told against the objectivity 
of CHt1(st1).  Consider a rational agent who, at t1, entertains the proposition that s obtains at 
t1.  Which of the values of the two putatively objective chances, the macrochance value of .1 
or the (trivial) microchance value of 1, will the rational agent set his credence to?  Such an 
                                                            
19 The Principal Principle can be given more or less strict formulations, but hopefully this less strict formulation 
is sufficient to capture the flavor the objection.  This formulation is taken, almost word for word, from Lewis 
(1994), pg.475-476.   
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agent knows that s obtains, so he will obviously set the value of his credence to the value of 
the latter chance!  The supposed objective, non-extremal macrochance of s that exists even 
when s obtains is clearly not capable of rationally constraining one’s credence in the 
proposition that s obtains.  And since the putatively objective macrochance does not 
rationally constrain credence, it is not an objective chance after all.     
 These two objections from the Principal Principle are serious and worrisome.  That 
said, the first, which rejects chances of the form CHt(Rt`), can be mitigated with an appeal to 
the objectivity of chances of the form CHt(St).  To see that this is so, consider an analogy to a 
less controversial case. 
 Suppose that someone intends to flip a coin he knows to be fair coin, and suppose that 
he is interested in the proposition that the coin will land heads at least once during this trial.  
Before the first toss, the value of the probability that the coin will land heads at least once 
during this trial is .75.  Now he flips the coin once, and the coin lands tails.  After this first 
flip, the probability that the coin will land heads at least once during this trial changes to .5.   
 After the first flip, a rational agent will set his credence in the proposition that the 
coin lands heads at least once to .5.  But, this fact does not tempt us to the conclusion that the 
first probability, the value of which is .75, is not an objective probability.20  Rather, it is 
merely that, after the outcome of the first flip has been fixed (determined by the world at that 
time), the value of the second probability is the relevant value for a rational agent to set his 
credence to.  Before the first flip, where the outcome of this flip is not determined by the 
                                                            
20 The reader who is skeptical that there is an objective macrochance that a coin will land heads in two tosses 
should replace that proposition with whatever it is he thinks there is an objective chance of.  That the case 
involves coin flips, as opposed, to, say, the chance of a radium atom decaying in some amount of time, is 
inessential to the philosophical upshot of the example. 
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world at that time, the value of the first probability is the value that rationally constrains 
credence. 
 Now I wish to draw an analogy between this case and the case of macrochances.  
Chances of the form CHt1(Rt2) are analogous to the first chance in the coin flip case, and 
chances of the form cht1(Rt2) are analogous to the second chance in the coin flip case.  It is, 
just as the objector argues, true that, if the microstate of the system at t1 is fixed, a rational 
agent will set the value of her credence equal to the value of cht1(Rt2).  But, this is explained 
by the fact that CHt1(Rt2) involves two distinct chances: the macrochance at t1 that the 
microstate at t1 will be a microstate that can evolve into a microstate that is a possible realizer 
of R and the microchance at t1 that the microstate at t1 evolves into a microstate that realizes 
R.  Having fixed the microstate of the system at t1, the first chance is irrelevant, and so the 
rational agent will set his credence to the value of the second chance, which is just the value 
of cht1(Rt2).  So too in the coin flip case, where the value of the first probability involves the 
probability that the coin will land heads on the first toss and the probability that the coin will 
land heads on the second toss.  If the outcome of the first toss is fixed then a rational agent 
will set her credence to the value of the second chance. 
 The reason that, in the coin flip case, we are not tempted to think that the first chance 
fails to be objective is because we realize that the first chance rationally constrains credences 
only when the outcome of neither toss is fixed, and the agent is in a situation where the 
outcome of the first toss is fixed.  Analogously, we should not be tempted to think that, in the 
macrochance case, CHt1(Rt2) fails to objective, because we should realize the CHt1(Rt2) only 
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rationally constrains credences when the microstate of the system at t1 is not fixed, and the 
agent is in a situation where the microstate is fixed.21
 Unfortunately, the above response (if convincing at all) is only convincing to the 
extent that one accepts the objectivity of chances of the form CHt(st), since it is these chances 
that I claimed partly constitute chances of the form CHt(Rt`).  But now the objector will run 
the second objection from the Principal Principle which denies the objectivity of these latter 
chances.  Here it is not so clear what to say in response.  Though there may be contexts 
where it seems plausible to wonder what the value of CHt(st) is, as in the context of asking a 
dealer what the chance is of some arrangement of cards that a deck is in, it is hard to imagine 
a rational agent using that chance to constrain her credence in the proposition that s obtains at 
t1, since she already knows that s obtains at t1. 
I must admit, then, that more work must be done than can be done here to defend the 
chances I posit from the Principal Principle.  Some philosophers have independent reasons 
for arguing that the admissibility requirement on the Principal Principle should be tinkered 
with, and perhaps such tinkering would make room for the objectivity of chances of the form 
CHt(Rt`).22  My hope is that the reader will take the failure of supervenience and the strengths 
of the view that I have argued should replace it as prima facie evidence for a cautious 
optimism that the objection from the Principal Principle can be met.   
                                                            
21 There is, admittedly, an asymmetry between microchances and macrochances in this respect; if the microstate 
of a system is fixed, the macrochance no longer rationally constrains credences.  But, if the macrostate of the 
system is fixed, the microchance continues to rationally constrain credences.  This asymmetry is explained by 
the difference in the strength of the constraints placed on a world by fixing a microstate rather than a 
macrostate.  (See section IV) 
22 I am thinking, here, of Carl Hoefer in particular.  See Hoefer (ms). 
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X. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, I have argued, with the use of two counterexamples, that 
supervenience is false.  In the place of supervenience, I have offered a rival account of the 
relationship between macrostates and microstates according to which a macrostate of a 
system at a time is not determined by the actual microstate of that system at that time, but 
rather by a probability distribution that obtains over possible microstates at that time.  This 
account is suggested, I claim, by the counterexamples to supervenience, and captures our 
various intuitions about the probability of microstates given various macrostates.  Finally, I 
have spent some time describing and defending the sort of objective macrochance there must 
be if the view I favor is true.  Both my denial of supervenience and the view I offer to replace 
it will prove to be highly controversial, and I have already gestured at the sort of response, 
motivated by the Principal Principle, that I find most threatening to my positive account.  
That said, I have tried to provide both plausible reasons to reject supervenience and plausible 
reasons to take seriously my rival account.  The least I hope for is that Elliott Sober will be 
pleased. 
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